longer than McCrory would have served if he had only been convicted of selling the small package of crack. McCrory's new sentence roughly equalled that which he would have received had he been found guilty at trial of possessing the drugs and guns in the first place. In contrast, under the pre-Guidelines regime the effect of the illegally seized evidence would have been unpredictable. 2 With the newly magnified importance of illegally seized evidence, should courts apply the exclusionary rule at sentencing? The exclusionary rule does not apply in all circumstances. In deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule in a given evidentiary context or type of proceeding, the Supreme Court uses a balancing test that examines, on one side, the deterrence to police acting illegally and, on the other side, the need for the evidence. 3 The Supreme Court has never decided whether the exclusionary rule applies at sentencing. Courts applying the balancing test have split on its application to post-Guidelines sentencing proceedings. Most courts find the exclusionary rule inapplicable at sentencing, allowing the introduction of illegally seized evidence. These "traditional rule" courts see the Guidelines as simply a newer version of the old sentencing regime and see no need to alter the old rule. Other courts argue that the new regime requires application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing. These "changed circumstances" courts insist that unless sentencing judges apply the exclusionary rule to relevant conduct evidence, excluding the evidence at trial in the first place is a mere formality.
Unfortunately, neither side has successfully reconciled its conclusions with both the Guidelines and the Supreme Court's balancing test. The "traditional rule" courts simply cite pre-Guidelines cases in applying the balancing test. The "changed circumstances" courts not only fail to apply both sides of the balancing test, but also ignore language in the Sentencing Reform Act and Guidelines that seems to prohibit the application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing.
This Comment addresses these shortcomings by proposing a new interpretation of the purpose and effect of the Guidelines. The. Comment uses this perspective to properly apply the Supreme 2 The sentence would probably have been lighter as well. See note 24 and accompanying text.
' Once the Supreme Court makes a determination that the exclusionary rule applies in a particular type of proceeding, or evidentiary context, lower courts usually must apply the rule without regard for the facts of the individual case. For instance, once the Court decided that the exclusionary rule did not apply to grand jury proceedings, lower courts could not balance case by case to decide whether to impose the exclusionary rule.
Court's balancing test and to explain why the ambiguous language in the Act and Guidelines does not conflict with the exclusionary rule. It concludes that courts should apply the exclusionary rule at sentencing to the same extent that they apply the rule at trial. Section I of this Comment explains the exclusionary rule by laying out the balancing test used by the Supreme Court to determine whether to create exceptions to the rule. It then describes pre-Guidelines cases that allowed the use of illegally seized evidence at sentencing. Section II discusses the Sentencing Guidelines, focusing on the way in which they changed sentencing. Section III explores the clash between the traditional rule and the Sentencing Guidelines. It then examines the approaches of the "traditional rule" and "changed circumstances" courts. Section IV suggests that both have misunderstood the Guidelines. That Section adopts a new view of the Guidelines for examining the relationship between the Guidelines and the exclusionary rule. From that viewpoint, Section V re-examines both the Supreme Court's balancing test and the statutory language. It concludes that the balancing test and the statute favor applying the exclusionary rule at sentencing.
I. THE COMMON LAW: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND SENTENCING

A. What is the Exclusionary Rule?
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures," ' 4 but contains no enforcement provision. To fill this gap, the Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule forbids the government from using evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment against the victim of that seizure. 5 But this judicially created remedy is not absolute.' It applies in evidentiary contexts and types of proceedings where the Supreme Court has determined that "the rule's deterrent effect will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process." '7 The exclusionary rule exists only to deter 4 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... US Const, Amend IV. I Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 392-93 (1914); Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 648-49 (1961) .
' Illinois v KruU, 480 US 340, 347 (1987) .
future unreasonable seizures and applies only in those evidentiary contexts and types of proceedings where it achieves that purpose. 8 The Court first applied this "deterrence versus cost" balancing test in the 1974 case of United States v Calandra. 9 The Calandra Court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply during a grand jury proceeding. 10 The Court reasoned that withholding illegally seized evidence from the grand jury would not add much to the deterrence gained from excluding the evidence at trial. Even with a grand jury indictment the prosecutor would still have to make his case at trial without the use of the illegally seized evidence." The Court held that the slight increase in deterrence that exclusion would produce did not weigh heavily against the resulting costs to the historical role of the grand jury, a role which demanded a wide ranging inquiry not bogged down by the traditional rules of evidence.' 2 Calandra articulated the current balancing test for deciding when to apply the exclusionary rule.
B. The Traditional Rule: The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply at Sentencing
The Supreme Court has expressly declined to decide whether the exclusionary rule applies at sentencing.1 3 The current rule has evolved from a series of lower court decisions spurred by two Ninth Circuit cases, Verdugo v United States 4 and United States v Vandemark.1 5 In Verdugo, the Ninth Circuit remanded a case for resentencing, because the district court based the sentence on evidence that had been seized illegally by the police with the specific intention of increasing that sentence.' 6 The court observed that when the police decided to search Verdugo's home, the agents already had in their possession sufficient evidence to convict Verdugo of the original transaction. The court therefore inferred that the officers sought additional evidence not for arrest, but to locate a large supply of heroin that would be admissible in sentencing. 1 7 The Ninth Circuit instructed the lower court not to rely upon the illegally seized evidence at sentencing. The holding keyed on the court's subjective determination that the particular police division, a highly-specialized narcotics unit, had a motive to ensure Verdugo's long-term incarceration. 8 A later Ninth Circuit case, United States v Vandemark, 9 adopted the exception that swallowed the rule. Vandemark limited the application of Verdugo to "blatantly illegal" searches where the defendant could prove that the sole motive for seizing the evidence was to increase his sentence. 0 Other circuits have generally accepted the Vandemark limitation, paying only lip service to the Verdugo holding. 2 ' Practically, this limitation has proved decisive: in the twenty-four years since Verdugo, no defendant has been able to exclude evidence based on Verdugo.
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II. A NEW SENTENCING REGIME Prior to November of 1987, the trial inquired into the crime; sentencing into the defendant's character. While stringent evidentiary and procedural standards governed the trial, sentencing proceeded in relative freedom. In fact, a sentence within statutory limits was not subject to review unless it was based on unconstitutional factors. 2 ' 18 Id. 19 522 F2d 1019. 20 Id at 1022-24. In Vandemark, the Ninth Circuit allowed the government to introduce at sentencing evidence the police obtained after an unconstitutional stop and search of the defendant's car. Id at 1020-21. While Vandemark used language suggesting that Verdugo would apply to all cases where the use of illegally seized evidence at sentencing "would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures," id at 1023, Vandemark actually distinguished Verdugo on three grounds: first, that Verdugo had involved a "blatantly illegal" and highly intrusive seizure, id at 1023; second, that the officers already had sufficient evidence for arrest, id at 1023-24; and third and "most importantly," that the evidence was seized for the sole purpose of enhancing the defendant's sentence, id at 1024. This traditional regime forced the prosecutor to focus his energies on the trial alone. As Judge Easterbrook recently commented, " [t] o get a steep sentence the prosecutor needed to obtain a conviction on one very serious charge or multiple less serious ones. Excluding the evidence from the case in chief was a grievous, often mortal, blow."
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Congress levelled this century-old regime with the "sweeping reforms 2 5 of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.26 One of the central purposes of the Act was to reduce disparities in sentencing; 6ften defendants convicted of seemingly similar crimes received vastly different sentences." Consequently, the Act created the United States Sentencing Commission and empowered it to develop guidelines for judges to use when sentencing.
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Under this authority, the Commission enacted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 29 and fundamentally changed the nature and goals of sentencing by making "all sentences basically determinate. '30 Under the Guidelines, the judge must impose the sentence indicated by the Guidelines' matrix. The matrix assigns a base number according to the nature and severity of the conviction crime and lists a variety of "relevant conduct" factors that add to or subtract from the base number; the number that emerges provides a narrow range within which the judge selects the defendant's sentence. 3 " Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1837 , 1987 (1984 , codified as amended at 18 USC § § 3551-3673 (1988); 28 USC § § 991-998 (1988) . The Sentencing Reform Act was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 , Pub L No 98-472, 98 Stat 1837 , 1976 (1984 .
2 See S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 38-39 (Oct 11, 1984) 33 Each of these "traditional rule" courts agreed that the exclusionary rule would apply in only the rarest of circumstances, if at all, and each allowed the use of illegally seized evidence at sentencing. That four circuits have confronted in one year an issue that had been dormant for over two decades suggests that courts have suddenly become uneasy with the traditional rule. Yet few courts have been willing to reverse course. Only two district court decisions, one of which was recently vacated, and a concurring opinion in the Seventh Circuit have abandoned the traditional rule in the post-Guidelines world. 34 These "changed circumstances" opinions understood that the Guidelines altered sentencing enough that a post-Guidelines judge must apply the exclusionary rule to illegally seized evidence.
Though contradictory, these cases all share a common thread. Both the "traditional rule" and "changed circumstances" cases reveal the irony of giving illegally seized evidence essentially the same effect when used to calculate a sentence as it would have had if introduced at trial. The case introduced at the beginning of this Comment, McCrory," 3 provides a good example of this irony.
In that case, two undercover officers bought a small amount of crack cocaine from McCrory. After leaving him, they broadcast the location of his apartment and a "veritable SWAT team descended upon it, carrying everything except a search warrant, and conducted what the government [] conceded was an unconstitutional search in which they found a large cache of drugs and guns." 36 The prosecutor introduced the additional evidence at sentencing as "relevant conduct" under the Guidelines. The evidence increased McCrory's sentence from a range of twenty-seven to thirty-three Note that the top range of this hypothetical sentence differs from his actual sentence by only two months.
This ironic result allows the prosecution to evade the exclusionary rule. In the post-Guidelines world, the prosecutor can achieve almost exactly the same sentence with illegally seized evidence introduced at sentencing as he would have achieved if there were no exclusionary rule at all. Indeed, in contrast to the preGuidelines cases, the prosecution can calculate the effect of the illegally seized evidence with mathematical precision. Once the police make a simple street bust, the government has every incentive to search the defendant's property without a warrant.
The post-Guidelines sentencing regime so distorts the results under the traditional rule that it demands a re-evaluation of the need for the exclusionary rule at sentencing. In Calandra, the Supreme Court provided a balancing test for conducting this evaluation. Unfortunately, not one of the post-Guidelines cases has seriously examined both sides of the Supreme Court's exclusionary rule balancing test. The "traditional rule" courts that do not apply the exclusionary rule at sentencing stress the costs of exclusion, while the "changed circumstances" courts that do apply the exclusionary rule stress the loss in deterrence from allowing tainted evidence at sentencing. Consequently, the cases argue past each other, making resolution of the issue difficult. The rest of this Section analyzes and critiques these arguments.
B. "Traditional Rule" Cases
The four circuits that adhere to the traditional rule 38 have advanced two arguments for not applying the exclusionary rule at sentencing: 1) the Calandra balance weighs against the rule; and 2) Congress statutorily resolved the issue. This Section evaluates these arguments. 
Arguments based on the Calandra balancing test.
Under the Calandra balancing test, the Supreme Court weighs deterrence of police misconduct against costs of exclusion when considering whether to apply the exclusionary rule. All four of the "traditional rule" courts concluded that excluding illegally seized evidence from sentencing would not add to the deterrence gained from exclusion at trial and that excluding such evidence would impose significant costs on the sentencing hearing. Therefore, they reasoned, courts should not exclude such evidence from sentencing. 9 But these courts relied entirely on the conclusions of preGuidelines cases for authority on both sides of the balancing test. Not one of these courts seriously considered the effect of the Guidelines. The D.C. Circuit's McCrory opinion provides a good example of this.
In analyzing the deterrence side of the balancing test, the McCrory opinion merely asserted that excluding tainted evidence at sentencing would not add significantly to the deterrence gained from excluding such evidence at trial. " to support its argument that the sentencing judge has always enjoyed freedom from evidentiary requirements so that she may prescribe an appropriate sentence for the offender. 45 The Williams Court had explained that sentencing served the unique function of tailoring the punishment to fit the offender; this value justified giving the sentencing judge more information than was available at trial. 46 Yet the McCrory, court relied on that 1949 case for its conclusion that there is a unique "Traditional rule" courts also draw support from a provision of the Sentencing Reform Act which on its face appears to reject limitations like the exclusionary rule at sentencing. Section 3661 of Title 18 of the Code provides:
[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.""
The "traditional rule" courts' reliance on § 3661 might be read in two ways. Both ways, without more, beg the question. Under the first interpretation, the "traditional rule" courts would read § 3661 to say that Congress directly intended to bar the application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing. But, as Judge Easterbrook observed in his Jewel concurrence, since the exclusionary rule is a constitutional requirement, § 3661 must bow to the extent it conflicts with the Fourth Amendment." Although the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, once the Calandra balancing test requires application of the rule, Congress cannot restrict application of the rule and leave an insufficient deterrent against Fourth Amendment violations.
Under the second interpretation, the "traditional rule" courts would read § 3661 as a substantive grant of discretion to the sentencing judge. This grant might take two forms. Section 3661 might be read to trump the matrix produced by the Sentencing Commission, but that would render the Guidelines meaningless. judges could consider any information outside the framework of the Guidelines, the Guidelines would no longer definitively guide sentencing. Alternatively, § 3661 might be seen as preserving the judge's discretion within the framework of the matrix. Here, the "traditional rule" courts use § 3661 to argue that the Guidelines have not significantly altered the costs side of the Calandra balancing test. That is, even after the Guidelines, the exclusionary rule would unduly hamper the sentencing judge's freedom-freedom evidenced by the recodification of § 3661. 51 Regardless of how much freedom to decide a sentence the judge actually has, these courts would argue, the existence alone of § 3661 demonstrates that the basic structure of sentencing has not changed. Even under this interpretation, reliance on § 3661 begs the question. The court can only calculate how much diminishing the sentencing judge's discretion affects the costs side of the Calandra balancing test if it looks to the judge's actual discretion during sentencing. The courts cannot "fool" Calandra by using the language of § 3661 to argue that the Guidelines have not diminished the judge's discretion when, in fact, they have. 2
C. "Changed Circumstances" Cases Why did four circuits suddenly need to reaffirm the traditional rule within the space of one year? Although only a few judges have been willing to challenge that rule, 3 they make a powerful argument against the notion that the Guidelines have had no serious effect. They argue that, under the Guidelines, the traditional rule creates a back door for illegally seized evidence and thereby undermines deterrence.
But these "changed circumstances" opinions all leave out a critical part of the analysis, ignoring the costs side of the balancing See Tejada, 956 F2d at 1262.
"
A variation of this argument is that the Guidelines themselves declare that there are no limits on the evidence a judge may consider, apart from that the evidence be reliable. Lynch, for example, cited § 6A1.3 of the Guidelines. That section reads: "In resolving any reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." Lynch, 934 F2d at 1236. The Lynch court argued that § 6A1.3 demonstrates that the judge has the same level of discretion post-Guidelines as the judge had pre-Guidelines. But this argument is vulnerable to the same attack as the argument made under § 3661. The judge may consider only evidence about "a factor important to the sentencing determination." Section 6A1.3 does not reveal how much discretion the sentencing judge actually has in imposing the proper sentence.
11 Cabrera, 756 F Supp at 135-36; Rulo, 748 F Supp at 45 n 6.
test. This hole in their argument makes it vulnerable to an easy attack. A good example comes from the saga of the Cabrera case.
In Cabrera, Judge Martin of the Southern District of New York argued that:
pre-guideline reasoning is not valid when applied to a sentencing scheme that requires the Court to provide specific increases in the sentencing level in specific factual settings. The existence of sentencing guidelines are well-known to police officers and federal agents and the impact of specific evidence on the sentence a defendant will receive surely cannot have escaped their notice. 4
Judge Martin thus focused exclusively on the deterrence side of the test. He apparently assumed that the new sentencing regime undermines deterrence to such an extent that evaluating the other side of the balancing test, the costs side, is unnecessary. Judge Martin is correct in arguing that the regime greatly undermines deterrence. As Judge Silberman, the concurring judge in the McCrory case, observed, handing excluded evidence to the sentencing judge now effectively circumvents the exclusionary rule at trial: "a more patent end run around the exclusionary rule is hard to imagine." 5 But the Cabrera opinion did not address the costs side of the balancing test. As the Second Circuit pointed out in its vacating opinion, "the Supreme Court has instructed us not to suppress evidence solely because doing so might deter illegal searches. Rather, the likelihood of increased deterrence must be balanced against the considerable cost of excluding reliable information." 6 Indeed, as the McCrory majority observed, precedent runs counter to arguments which rely solely on deterrence. 57 The argument in the district court Cabrera opinion failed for this reason.
The pre-Guidelines cases identified a cost of excluding evidence at sentencing. They reasoned that the value of basing a defendant's sentence on the widest range of information possible weighs heavily against whatever decrease in deterrence may result from introducing the tainted evidence. The post-Guidelines "changed circumstances" cases leave this argument untouched. Therefore, the analysis in post-Guidelines opinions is incomplete. Without adequate answers to the "traditional rule" courts' argument that sentencing values having the widest available range of information about the defendant, these "changed circumstances" cases argue for the unconstitutionality of long-standing precedent on the basis of only a partial application of the current test.
IV. How THE GUIDELINES CHANGED SENTENCING
When Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984, it intended to lift the cloak of unfettered judicial discretion which allowed improper influences to enter into some sentencing decisions. Congress did not intend for the Guidelines to entirely replace the prior regime. But the Sentencing Commission's end product had precisely that effect. The Guidelines shifted sentencing's focus from an unbounded inquiry into the character of the defendant to a structured extension of the trial's inquiry into the crime.
This Comment proposes a new model of the Guidelines that views the Sentencing Reform Act as an effort to filter inappropriate information out of sentencing. This section employs this viewpoint to suggest that the end product of that effort, the Sentencing Commission's Guidelines, cut out information about the defendant's background and character. This new model sees the Guidelines as a rejection of the sentencing regime described by the Supreme Court in Williams v New York. 5 8 In the Williams era, the trial inquired into the crime and sentencing inquired into the whole character of the defendant. The Guidelines, on the other hand, filter out all but a few precisely-defined aspects of character.
A. Exhuming Williams
The 1949 Williams Court ruled that the constitutional rights of confrontation and cross-examination that applied at trial did not apply at sentencing. 5 9 The Williams opinion centered on the Court's discussion about the difference between sentencing and trial. The Court reasoned that sentencing had historically been a proceeding different in nature from the trial. 60 The significance of Williams lies not in its holding, but in the Court's discussion of why sentencing and trial were by definition different.
'8 337 US 241 (1949) . 6 Id at 250-51. 60 Id at 246.
The Court offered three reasons to separate the trial from the sentencing. First, it saw the trial as an inquiry into the crime and sentencing as an inquiry into the character of the defendant.
6 1 Sentencing fulfilled a specific purpose: "the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime. "62 The outcome of the trial inquiry (the conviction) provided the judge with the basis for the sentence; the sentencing inquiry served the purpose of altering that number based on the character of the person being convicted." Second, the Williams Court justified a wide-open inquiry into the defendant's character as a way to help rehabilitate the defendant. Full information allowed the sentencing judge to prescribe "rehabilitation of those who respond to treatment and the permanent isolation of those who do not react." 64 In short, the Williams Court saw punishment as primarily a rehabilitative venture. In such a regime, the sentencing judge should have a full folder of information from which to diagnose a defendant and prescribe the appropriate rehabilitative medicine.
Third, the Williams majority recognized the intuitive quality of the sentencing judge's discretion. The Court observed that the sentencing judge "could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining" the punishment. 6 5 According to the Williams Court, a sentence reflected the judge's insight into the defendant's character, informed by the intuitive insight provided by this wide ranging inquiry. 6 This policy explains why a sentence, if within statutory limits, was not subject to review.
B. The Guidelines
Unreviewable discretion comes at a price. Concerned with seemingly arbitrary disparities in sentencing imposed on defend- ants who had committed facially similar crimes, 8 Congress sought to curtail significantly what it thought to be the source of the problem: unfettered judicial discretion." 9 Congress intended the Sentencing Reform Act to bring equality to the sentencing hearing by altering the procedure. The Guidelines accomplish this goal by telling the judge specifically what she may consider and what she may not, thereby filtering out the impurities that may hide behind judicial discretion. As two commentators have observed, "[t]he primary purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act and the sentencing guidelines is to bring about equality of punishment, so that similarly situated defendants convicted of similar offenses are similarly punished. Under the Guidelines, the relationship between trial and sentencing contrasts sharply with that described in Williams. First, the Guidelines regime shifted sentencing from a character-based inquiry to a crime-based inquiry. Congress wanted the Commission to retain considerations of character, but remove them from the sentencing judge's ad hoc discretion. Congress directed the Commission to build offender characteristics such as age, education, vocational skills, mental or emotional condition, drug dependence, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, and criminal history into the sentencing matrix. 1 Congress wanted the Guidelines to "reflect the general inappropriateness" of individual sentencing judges considering-on an ad hoc basis-aspects of the defendant's character, or whole person ("education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant"). 2 Congress thus codified into the Sentencing Reform Act its statutory goal of filtering inappropriate information out of sentencing by instructing the Commission to develop uniform policies for addressing these factors and to ensure that these factors were not left to the ad hoc determinations of the individual sentencing judge. Congress handed character decisions over to the Sentencing Commission to , 19-20 (1990) .
69 S Rep No 98-225 at 38-39, in 1984 USCCAN at 3221-22 (cited in note 27) ("These disparities, whether they occur at the time of the initial sentencing or at the parole stage, can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law confers on those judges and parole authorities responsible for imposing and implementing the sentence."). 
T' Bader and
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be appropriately considered and reflected in a limited way within the framework of the Guidelines. The Commission took this ball and ran with it. The resulting Guidelines barely pay lip service to the defendant's character. Apparently, the Commission had inadequate information on the influence of offender characteristics in sentencing and, pressed for time, "created very restrictive policies that put the onus on judges to articulate valid reasons for giving sentencing effect to personal characteristics. ' 7 The Guidelines Handbook confirms the new emphasis: "[a]mong the only offender characteristics taken into consideration by the Guidelines are the defendant's criminal record and criminal livelihood, which will enhance the sentencing range, and the defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the crime, which will lower the range." 4 Some courts read the Guidelines to bar any consideration of offender characteristics. 7 5 Hence, spurred by Congress's push to remove improper considerations from sentencing, the Commission effectively took the character inquiry away altogether.
The second change the Guidelines made was a shift away from rehabilitation as a goal of sentencing. The Commission's introduction to the Guidelines speaks only of the goals of "control of crime," "deterr [ence] ," "incapacita[tion]," and giving offenders their "just deserts. 76 Any mention of "rehabilitation" is conspicuously absent.
The third change the Guidelines brought about was a rejection of intuitive sentencing as described in Williams. The Guidelines all but eliminated the sentencing judge's unfettered discretion, which had previously served to ensure that the punishment fit the offender. The Guidelines clearly reflect this policy. They do allow a judge to depart from the determined sentence when she finds that the Sentencing Commission failed to adequately take into account aggravating or mitigating circumstances that warrant departure. • Guidelines Manual at 3-4 (cited in note 31).
USC § 3553(b) (1988).
But such departure is not intended to be common7 8 and the judge must state in open court her specific reasons for departing. 9 As Judge Easterbrook has observed, "[i]nstead of a wide-ranging inquiry into the defendant's character in which 'the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime,' sentencing has become a focused inquiry into the defendant's crimes." 8 "
The suggested "filter" viewpoint, described above, illustrates that the Commisssion did not design the Guidelines merely to tighten up sentencing for the sake of uniformity. Rather, they were the result of an effort to filter out of sentencing the wrong reasons, such as race, for imposing one sentence over another. 1 Viewed from this vantage point, one can easily see why Congress and the Sentencing Commission factored character considerations out of the sentence and imposed rigid requirements that eliminate the "intuitive" quality of the sentence.
V. How THE REJECTION OF CHARACTER-BASED SENTENCING AFFECTS THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ANALYSIS
Analyzing the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines as an elaborate "filter" highlights how they operationally rejected sentencing's historical function. This Section applies the "filter" viewpoint to suggest two ramifications of the Guidelines: 1) courts should resolve the Calandra balancing test in favor of applying the exclusionary rule at sentencing; and 2) courts can legitimately read § 3661 as subordinate to the exclusionary rule without ruling it unconstitutional.
78 The Commission intended departures in only "atypical" and "unusual" cases. ", Race accounts for a great deal of disparity in sentencing. A well-known example of this problem comes from a study which showed that, in Georgia, defendants charged with killing white persons were one and a half times as likely to receive the death penalty as defendants charged with killing black persons. The Calandra balancing test requires the exclusionary rule where the deterrence benefit of the exclusion in the particular circumstance outweighs the costs of withholding reliable information in that circumstance. 8 2 The most recent Supreme Court exclusionary rule case, James v Illinois, rejected the use of illegally seized evidence to impeach a defense witness's testimony and distinguished a previous case in which the Court allowed illegally seized evidence to impeach the defendant's testimony. 8 3 On the costs side of the test, the James Court reasoned that since a criminal defendant will more likely lie on the stand and risk a perjury charge than a witness, excluding evidence impeaching a defendant has a greater cost than excluding evidence impeaching a witness. 8 4 More importantly, for present purposes, in evaluating deterrence of police misconduct, the James Court stated:
[M]uch if not most of the time, police officers confront opportunities to obtain evidence illegally after they have already legally obtained (or know that they have other means of legally obtaining) sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case. In these situations, a rule requiring exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from only the government's case in chief would leave officers with little to lose and much to gain by overstepping constitutional limits on evidence gathering. Narrowing the exclusionary rule in this manner, therefore, would significantly undermine the rule's ability to "compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." ' The James analysis lays out a standard for deciding when allowing tainted evidence undercuts the deterrent value of the rule eriough to reject the use of the tainted evidence. The James Court recognized a serious problem with allowing illegally seized evidence where police officers already possess evidence adequate to establish a prima facie case. The Court thought the need for deterrence greatest when police face the highest temptation to seize evidence illegally. 6 82 United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 347-49 (1974 ). 8-493 US 307, 320 (1990 ), distinguishing Walder v United States, 347 US 62, 65 (1954 Sentencing under the Guidelines presents a paradigmatic example of a situation that meets the James standard for three reasons. First, a real offense system, as presented by the Guidelines, increases incentives to seize evidence by "overstepping constitutional limits on evidence gathering." Second, the certainty of an increased sentence with illegally seized evidence raises the incentives to acquire it. Finally, the police know well the effects of the Guidelines. a) Real offense systems. The Guidelines impose a "real offense" system.1 7 In contrast to a charge offense system, which bases a defendant's sentence on the crime charged regardless of what crime he actually committed, a real offense system bases a defendant's sentence on the crime actually committed regardless of the crime charged.
For example, the sentence of a defendant convicted of possession of a small amount of cocaine may be based on an additional amount of cocaine that the defendant possessed, but which was never introduced at trial. If his sentence term imposed by the Guidelines is as long as the term he would have received for conviction of possessing the additional cocaine in the first place, his sentence is based on a real offense calculation. Such a result, which is common under the Guidelines, makes introducing illegally seized evidence at sentencing as attractive as at trial. Moreover, evidence introduced at sentencing is generally subject to a lower standard of proof. 8 8 Therefore, prosecutors strategically opt to save questionable evidence for sentencing once there is enough evidence to establish a simple drug conviction. b) Certainty of Guidelines' application. The certainty of the Guidelines' application also increases the incentive to offer illegally seized evidence to the sentencing judge. Judges seldom de- part from matrix-determined sentences. 9 Consequently, a police officer knows that any additional relevant evidence will enhance the sentence. With increased certainty about the effect of introducing an additional piece of evidence, the officer's incentive to conduct an illegal search increases. Pre-Guidelines courts reasoned that a law enforcement officer would be unlikely to engage in an illegal seizure for enhancing a defendant's sentence. This reasoning does not apply post-Guidelines. As Judge Martin explained in Cabrera:
That reasoning was valid when applied to a sentencing structure that gave the district judge almost unlimited discretion in selecting a sentence below the statutory maximum, including the discretion to consider or not consider suppressed evidence. This pre-guideline reasoning is not valid when applied to a sentencing scheme that requires the Court to provide specific increases in the sentencing level in specific factual settings. 90 c) Police knowledge of the Guidelines' effects. Unlike the evidentiary rules of witness impeachment, the "existence of sentencing guidelines are [sic] well-known to police officers and federal agents and the impact of specific evidence on the sentence a defendant will receive surely cannot have escaped their notice."'" The Guidelines operate in a relatively straightforward manner, 92 and the Commission actively trains teams of investigators how to navigate through the sentencing matrix. 93
" The most recent study shows sentences involving departures from the Guidelines' range occurred 16.6% of the time. " The Act authorized the Sentencing Commission to "devise and conduct periodic training programs of instruction in sentencing techniques for judicial and probation personnel and other persons connected with the sentencing process." 28 USC § 995(a) (18) (1988) . The Sentencing Commission, in 1990, "provided training to approximately 4,028 individuals Moreover, the police officers involved in the cases usually at issue here-drug cases-readily know when they have enough evidence for a prima facie case against the defendant. Since all that is needed to get additional evidence in at sentencing is a minor drug conviction, one arrest for simple possession sufficiently establishes a prima facie case. Once the police caught McCrory selling a small amount of crack, they ordered the warrantless search of his house. d) Experience under the Guidelines. The Guidelines make seizing evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment extremely attractive to police once there is a street bust for possession of drugs. Moreover, the structure and effect of the Guidelines are well known to police officers. Thus, sentencing under the Guidelines is a textbook example of a case where the likelihood of deterrence from excluding evidence is high. In theory, without excluding illegally seized evidence at sentencing, any deterrence gained from excluding that evidence at trial disappears.
Experience under the Guidelines vindicates this analysis. The prosecution in McCrory introduced enough evidence of "relevant conduct" to increase McCrory's sentence nine fold. McCrory is not unusual. In Torres, the additional evidence was a kilogram of cocaine.
9 4 In Lynch, the prosecutor introduced illegally seized handguns to the sentencing judge after the jury had acquitted Lynch of all firearms counts. 9 5 In Cabrera, the prosecutor offered an additional kilogram of cocaine and a handgun, evidence which would have added over two years to the defendant's sentence."'
The Seventh Circuit, in Jewel, although remanding the case on different grounds, confronted the same situation these four courts faced. In a concurring opinion, Judge Easterbrook put the situation in perspective.
Our case is the norm: the prosecutor charged the defendants with distributing slightly more than 5 kilograms of drugs but asked for a sentence based on more than 50 (and the court imposed a sentence based on more than 15). Where once courts sentenced the offender and not the conduct, now courts sentence for crimes that were the subject of neither charge nor conviction. In proving such additional crimes, illegally seized evidence may play a central role-the same sort of role it used to play in supporting convictions on additional counts. 8
The prosecutors in these cases used the "relevant conduct" section of the Guidelines as a trump card when unable to get the evidence into the trial. This situation is certainly more troublesome than the situation in James, and clearly meets the James standard.
Here the rules are simple and the predictions are more than mere conjecture. Here police officers have "little to lose and much to gain" by seizing the additional evidence. 9 9
2. Cost to the truthseeking process.
The cost to the truthseeking process represents the second side of the Calandra balancing test. On the surface, distinguishing between trial and sentencing at all when applying the exclusionary rule seems odd. If a judge decides to deprive the government of the use of evidence because she finds that the government violated the Constitution to get it, an initial reaction might advocate the exclusion of such evidence for the entire criminal prosecution from start to finish. What logical distinction between trial and sentencing justifies applying the exclusionary rule at one but not at the other?
The Supreme Court answered this question with respect to a grand jury proceeding in Calandra where it first employed the current balancing test. Stressing the grand jury's "historic role and functions," the Court noted that the grand jury "has traditionally been allowed to pursue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial."' 0 0 Thus, in the grand jury setting, the exclusionary rule would impose a greater cost on the truthseeking process than the rule imposes at trial.
The courts that created the traditional rule exempting sentencing from the exclusionary rule used similar reasoning. As with the grand jury analysis, the courts applied the Calandra balancing test. When these courts addressed the costs side of the test, they afforded substantial weight to the historical function of the sentencing judge which they derived from Williams v New York.' 0 ' More to the point, the decisions that created the traditional Id at 240 (Easterbrook concurring). James, 493 US at 319. '0 United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 348-49 (1974) . Since giving a just sentence depends on perceiving the totality of the defendant, Nussbaum argues, "categories for mitigation should not be codified in advance for it will be impossible for such a code to anticipate adequately the countless ways in which factors interweave and bear upon one another in human reality.' 10 7
The pre-Guidelines world embodied this vision by giving the sentencing judge complete discretion, and by basing the sentence on the offender rather than on the crime. This flexible aspect of sentencing created an important distinction between trial and sentencing. When Congress removed improper considerations from sentencing through the Guidelines' "filter," they cut out the distinctive feature of sentencing. The Guidelines impose categories of mitigation and aggravation, and prevent the sentencing judge from ever perceiving the offender as anything more than a combination of several pre-selected categorical factors.
In the post-Guidelines regime, additional evidence introduced at sentencing serves the same function such evidence would serve at trial. Logically, then, excluding illegally seized evidence imposes precisely the same cost on the proceeding, whether excluded at trial or at sentencing. Consider the guns and drugs excluded at McCrory's trial. The exclusion of the illegally seized guns and drugs at trial was not costless; the exclusionary rule deprived-the jury of highly probative evidence that would have helped them decide whether McCrory committed crimes relating to drug and gun possession. But with the Guidelines' matrix, the cost of exclusion at sentencing is the same as the cost of exclusion at trial, since the tainted evidence would only help with a further inquiry into the crime. The matrix system cut out the inquiry into McCrory's character. In the pre-Guidelines world, the courts could justify refusing to apply the exclusionary rule at sentencing because doing so would impair "the historic role and functions of the [sentencing hearing]." 0 8 But that role is now gone.
3. Deterrence and costs balanced.
Since the Guidelines' sentencing structure almost entirely undermines any deterrence gained in excluding evidence from trial in the first place, arguably one need not look to the second part of the 108 Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy 37 (paper delivered for the Dewey Lecture, University of Chicago Law School) (Apr 22, 1992 ) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
107 Id at 46. "I Calandra, 414 US at 349 ("sentencing hearing" superimposed over "grand jury").
